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When conflicts  and disagreements  cannot  be resolved because there  is no  common 
ground, it might be better to replace the fight for ‘the truth’ by an exchange of argu-
ments whose primary purpose is not to ‘win’ but to stimulate reflection, creativity, and 
perspective shifts. This is what I call “reflective argumentation” by contrast to three bet-
ter known approaches to  argument which Christoph Lumer distinguished recently ac-
cording to their “standard function”1: (a)  rhetorical argumentation focuses on persua-
sion;2 (b)  consensus  theories of argumentation on reaching consensus, i.e., shared be-
liefs, in an argumentative discourse3; and (c) epistemological theories of argumentation, 
finally, define the “standard output” of arguments as knowledge or justified belief.4 The 
primary purpose of reflective argumentation, by contrast, is to develop arguments as a 
means to clarify one’s own thinking—either individually or in groups—and to stimulate 
change of this thinking, that is learning. 
“Argument” is often used in the confrontational sense of the term. This usage, how-
ever, distracts from a more productive function of arguments: the function to support 
understanding, reflection, and cognitive change. When we understand an argument, we 
understand the reasoning behind someone’s position.  Since there  are  mostly various 
ways to  argue for  a position,  we can see in someone’s arguments how this person 
1 Christoph Lumer, "Introduction: The Epistemological Theory of Argumentation—a Map," Informal  
Logic, 25, 3 (2005): 189-212, at p. 189-190.
2 See Chaïm Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca,  The New Rhetoric.  A Treatise on Argumentation, 
Translated by John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame, Ind.:  University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1969 <1958>); and C. L. Hamblin, Fallacies (London: Methuen 1970).
3  See, for example, Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, A Systematic Theory of Argumen-
tation. The Pragma-Dialectical Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
4 This is the position Lumer himself presents in the “Introduction” of two special issues he edited for 
Informal Logic, 25, 3 (2005) and 26, 1 (2006), and in "The Epistemological Theory of Argument—
How and Why?," Informal Logic, 25, 3 (2005): 213-43. See also Alvin I. Goldman, "Argumentation 
and Social Epistemology," Journal of Philosophy XCI, 1 (1994): 27-49, his Knowledge in a Social 
World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), and his "An Epistemological Approach to Argumentation," 
Informal Logic, 23 (2003): 51-63.
2frames and structures a problem. Conversely, when we are able to construct an argu-
ment, we are able to clarify and structure our own thinking, and to change it if we iden-
tify gaps, unjustified assumptions, contradictions, or open questions.
Supporting understanding, reflection, and cognitive change is a function of argu-
ments that did not get much philosophical attention so far—in spite of its significance in 
many areas of life. Given the standard definition of arguing as ‘providing reasons for a 
claim,’ we can say that arguing is the essence of scientific activity since providing evi-
dence for a hypothesis and developing justifications for positions is just this: providing 
reasons for a claim. Understanding the world means being able to formulate arguments 
why the world is the way it is said it is. Arguments promote understanding when used to 
represent  knowledge,  hypotheses,  explanations,  or  objections  to  claims.  Arguments, 
however, are also crucial in social interaction and public affairs. We use arguments to 
justify positions regarding matters of fact; norms, values, and principles; and recommen-
dations to act. Thus, arguments are crucial for peaceful interaction in face-to-face com-
munication and deliberation, in policy and decision making, in planning, in conflict man-
agement, and in any kind of cooperation. In all these areas, however, the point of argu-
ing should not be reduced to  persuading others and finding consensus or knowledge; 
our concept of arguing should include using the construction and reconstruction of ar-
guments as a means to better understand our own thinking and that of others, and to 
change it if reflection leads us to acknowledging that change is necessary.
The objective of the following considerations is, first, to clarify the conditions of re-
flective argumentation in this sense of the term and, second, to discuss the possibilities 
of argument visualization methods in supporting reflection and cognitive change. As we 
will see, there are many argument visualization tools on the market—developed mainly 
to support decision making—that can be used for the purpose I have in mind. However, 
when it comes to  changing habits of thinking and  learning by means of arguments it 
should be necessary to reflect, first of all, on the conditions that argument visualization 
methods need to fulfill to achieve this goal. If the main purpose of formulating or ex-
changing arguments is cognitive change and learning, then we need a method of arguing 
which is based on an analysis of cognitive conditions of learning processes.
Providing such an analysis is the objective of the first two parts of this paper. While 
3the first part develops an understanding of the cognitive problems we are facing in con-
flicts—obviously the area where belief change is hardest—the second part will, based on 
this, determine a set of requirements argument visualization tools should fulfill if their 
main purpose is stimulating reflection and cognitive change. In the third part, I will eval-
uate available argument visualization methods with regard to  these requirements and 
talk about their limitations. The fourth part, then, introduces a new method of argument 
visualization which I  call Logical Argument  Mapping (LAM).  LAM has specifically 
been designed to support reflective argumentation in the following domains:
• in educational settings to foster the ability to argue 
• in science, across scientific disciplines, between science and the public, and in 
policy and decision making to facility communication, collaboration, reflection, 
and learning on highly complex issues like climate change and climate policies
• in conflict management to support conflict resolution and cross-cultural under-
standing by visualizing the inferential structure of framing processes that deter-
mine how parties to a conflict make sense of what is going on.5
The fifth part, finally, provides an example of how Logical Argument Mapping could be 
used as a method of reflective argumentation in a political controversy.
The main objective of this article is to defend two theses: first, that available argu-
ment visualization tools do not challenge users enough to induce cognitive change; and, 
second, that the potential of Logical Argument Mapping in this regard is based on the 
fact that it uses—in contrast to all argument visualizations methods I know of—primari-
ly deductively valid argument schemes. To argue for both these points, however, it is 
necessary to develop first a better understanding of the cognitive problems reflective ar-
gumentation faces.
Before I start,  let me define some concepts. As indicated already, I am using the 
term “argument” as a constellation of statements which consists of a claim and at least 
one statement that is intended as a reason for this claim. The term “argumentation,” by 
contrast, will be used here as a set of statements in which elements of an argument are 
5 See Michael H.G. Hoffmann,  "Logical Argument  Mapping:  A Method for Overcoming Cognitive 
Problems of Conflict Management,"  International Journal of Conflict Management, 16, 4 (2005): 
304-34.
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and arguments. Additionally, I am introducing the concept of “argument revision” to de-
scribe the following three processes: (a) refining or changing the constitutive elements 
of arguments and argumentations; (b) introducing new elements or discarding existing 
ones; and (c) re-organizing the structure of arguments and argumentations. In Logical 
Argument Mapping these concepts are further specified by lists of “argument schemes,” 
“conflict schemes,” and “revision schemes.”6 The term “argument visualization,” finally, 
is used for spatial representations of arguments, argumentations, and argument revisions 
in which the statements that constitute an argument are spatially separated and connect-
ed by arrows or lines. 
I. COGNITIVE PROBLEMS OF CONFLICTS
The hardest challenge for cognitive change are obviously those conflicts whose intracta-
bility results from conflicting systems of beliefs, values, and attitudes that  are deeply 
rooted in people’s thinking and feeling. How could it be possible, for instance, to “de-
radicalize” Islamist militants by means of arguments, as Indonesia’s anti-terrorism police 
attempted in the aftermath of the Bali bombing in 2002 which killed 202 people?7 There 
are good reasons to be skeptical, as Robert Fogelin showed already two decades ago. 
Fogelin argued  that  what  he called “deep disagreements”—by contrast  to  “normal” 
argumentative exchange—“cannot be resolved through the use of argument,  for they 
undercut the conditions essential to arguing.” The possibility of arguing, he says, pre-
supposes “a shared background of beliefs and preferences,” and if such a background is 
not given, there is no way of “rational” dispute resolution.8 Therefore, only “normal” 
argumentative exchange is possible for Fogelin, where “normal” means: “within a con-
text of broadly shared beliefs and preferences.” If I ask Fogelin why he takes a certain 
route for his shopping and he responds, “I want to pick up the fish last,” there is no need 
6 See http://www.prism.gatech.edu/~mh327/LAM/.
7 See "Reforming  Jihadists.  Preachers  to  Be Converted,"  Economist,  385,  8559  (Dec.  15,  2007): 
71-72.
8 Robert Fogelin, "The Logic of Deep Disagreements," Informal Logic, 7 (1985): 1-8, pp. 5, 7.
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that we prefer fresh over stinking fish.
Fogelin mentions disputes over the morality of abortion, or affirmative action quota, 
to make his point that it is impossible to resolve deep disagreements by means of argu-
ments. The crucial feature in those cases is that the source of disagreement are not sim-
ply “isolated propositions (‘The fetus is a person.’), but instead a whole system of mutu-
ally supporting propositions (and paradigms, models, styles of acting and thinking).” 
Similarly, Allen Buchanan showed in his analysis of what he called “selective cognitive 
disabilities” that false beliefs like racist or sexist prejudices “are typically elements of a 
web of  mutually supporting false beliefs.”9 Those  “webs” of  beliefs are  resistant  to 
change because they can easily be defended against any sort of evidence to the contrary 
by ad hoc hypotheses. Referring to his own childhood in the racist American South, he 
tells the story how people who believed “in the mental inferiority of blacks” systematic-
ally excluded obvious counter examples simply by appealing “to another strand in their 
complex web of racist beliefs: the notion that the presence of some ‘white blood’ in a 
black person could raise him above the low position of blacks generally.”10 Any core be-
lief can be saved by  ad hoc hypotheses. By contrast  to  Fogelin, however,  Buchanan 
thinks that it is possible to change things. But this “will typically require more than just 
providing good evidence that a particular belief is false. Instead, the process will require 
attacking a large set of mutually supporting beliefs,” that is as a whole.11
Those  “webs” of mutually supporting beliefs are  not  only relevant  when people 
argue, but also—on a deeper level—for those cognitive processes which determine how 
we perceive and interpret the world around us. In conflict research it has long been ob-
served that a crucial obstacle for the resolution of conflicts is often that stakeholders 
“frame” in radically different ways what their conflict is about, its history, central events 
and data, their own role in it, that of their opponents and third parties, and how it might 
be resolved.12 Elsewhere, I proposed to use the term “sensemaking” to distinguish more 
9 Allen Buchanan,  "Social  Moral  Epistemology,"  Social  Philosophy & Policy,  19,  2 (Sum, 2002): 
126-52, at p. 140.
10 Ibid., pp. 139-140.
11 Buchanan, "Social Moral Epistemology," p. 140.
12 See for example Barbara Gray, "Mediation as Framing and Framing within Mediation," in Margaret 
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ble, on the one hand, in how parties to a conflict set the boundaries around an issue and 
construct meanings on the other.13 Sensemaking can be defined as the process of inter-
preting data in a way that they fit into a belief-value-attitude system, where “data” can 
be externally observable signs, people, things, events, etc., but also ideas or thoughts; 
and a “belief-value-attitude system” is a web of beliefs, values, and attitudes that is more 
or less consistent from its bearer’s point of view. The “fit” of data into a belief-value-at-
titude system can be achieved either by constraining the data (neglecting what is incom-
prehensible, or interpreting it in a way that it fits); by changing the system; or by a mix-
ture of both. When I am talking about “cognitive change,” I mean any change within a 
belief-value-attitude system.
Some of the most important difficulties we face in conflict management can be ex-
plained by the observation that belief-value-attitude systems are hard to change. Espe-
cially in cases where the individual or social identity of stakeholders is intrinsically tied 
to a certain belief-value-attitude system, trying to change the system becomes easily ex-
perienced as an existential threat. Social psychologist Dan Bar-Tal coined the term “so-
ciopsychological infrastructure” to describe the fundamental role of what I call belief-
value-attitude systems in intractable conflicts.14 It  is essential for parties to  intractable 
conflicts to  develop such a “sociopsychological infrastructure” in order to  cope with 
stress and fear; to  satisfy psychological needs like “knowing, mastery, safety, positive 
identity”; and to “develop a system of psychological conditions such as loyalty to a soci-
ety and country, high motivation to contribute, persistence, readiness for personal sacri-
fice, unity, solidarity” that is necessary to withstand the rival group.15 This sociopsycho-
S.  Herrman,  The  Blackwell  Handbook  of  Mediation:  Bridging  Theory,  Research,  and  Practice 
(Malden, MA; Oxford, U.K.; Carlton, AU: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 193-216, and Deborah Shmueli, 
Michael  Elliott,  and Sanda Kaufman,  "Frame Changes and the Management  of Intractable Con-
flicts," Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 24, 2 (2006): 207-18.
13 See Michael H.G. Hoffmann, "Analyzing Framing Processes by Means of Logical Argument Map-
ping," Intl. Association for Conflict Management, IACM 20TH Annual Conference Paper, Available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1298520 (2008).
14 Daniel  Bar-Tal,  "Sociopsychological  Foundations  of Intractable Conflicts,"  American  Behavioral  
Scientist, 50 (2007): 1430-53, at p. 1434.
15 Ibid.
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narratives that form a “configuration of shared central beliefs that provide a particular  
dominant orientation to a society at present and for the future,” and through the “col-
lective emotional orientation  of  a  society.”16 This  infrastructure  “serves  as  a  prism 
through  which  the  society  members  collect  information  and  interpret  new 
experiences”17—information and experiences that again confirm the narratives and emo-
tions that constituted the sociopsychological infrastructure in the first place, contributing 
thus to perpetuating conflicts that are called “intractable” just because of those mecha-
nisms of seemingly eternal reinforcement.
However, changing belief-value-attitude systems is not only hard in intractable con-
flicts. If we define—following Charles Peirce—“beliefs” as “habits,” it is clear that be-
liefs will not be easier to change than habits. “We believe the proposition we are ready 
to act upon,” wrote Peirce.18 This suggests that we change our beliefs only in situations 
where it turns out that our “intellectual habits” are insufficient to cope with problems. 
When our beliefs are disrupted by doubts induced by new experiences, creativity is nec-
essary to  change and develop our belief-habits. As long as they “work,” however, no 
change is necessary. Isaac Levi called this the principle of “doxastic inertia” in Peirce’s 
pragmatism.19
By contrast to Buchanan who only talks about webs of mutually supporting false be-
liefs, and to conflict researchers who use the term “framing” only to describe partisan 
behavior, I would argue that belief-value-attitude systems are basic for all perception (or 
interpretation).  The point of this argument  is the same that  Norwood  Hanson made 
when he argued for theory-ladenness of observation, or Duhem and Quine in their argu-
ments for the holistic character of scientific knowledge. But more significant—for my 
purposes—is the  form Helen Longino gave  this  argument.  Since “states  of  affairs” 
16 Ibid., pp. 1435-1440 (his italics).
17 Ibid., p. 1436.
18 Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce: Volumes I-VI,  Ed. By Charles Hartshorne and Paul 
Weiss, 1931–1935, Volumes VII-VIII, Ed. By Arthur W. Burks, 1958 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
UP), 1.635 (quoted according to volume and paragraph). See also CP 2.148, 2.435. 
19 Isaac Levi, "Pragmatism and Change of View," in  Cheryl  Misak,  Pragmatism (Calgary,  Alberta: 
Univ. of Calgary Press, 1999), pp. 177-201.
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that for which they are evidence or for which they can be taken as evidence,” it is clear, 
she writes, that any assumption of an evidential relation “depends on one’s other beliefs, 
which we can call background beliefs or assumptions.”20 Instead of a dyadic relation be-
tween hypothesis and evidence, we should assume thus a triadic relation with “back-
ground assumptions” as the third, mediating element.
Such a triadic epistemology implies that  a critical analysis of the way we justify 
knowledge claims by reference to evidence would lead to an infinite network of mutual-
ly supporting assumptions because any background assumption is again based on further 
evidential relations and background assumptions, and so on. Science would simply be 
impossible if we demand that authors of scientific publications reveal the ‘complete’ net-
work of mutually supporting background assumptions necessary for ‘justification’ in a 
perfect sense of the word. Instead, we take most of those background assumptions sim-
ply for granted, that is we don’t subject them “to empirical confirmation or disconfirma-
tion.”21 This, however, is nothing else than saying that assuming an evidential relation is 
partly based on habits. As long as our background assumptions remain implicit when we 
provide a certain state of affairs as evidence for a certain hypothesis, the process of pro-
viding evidence is habit-driven.
Since it is hard to see how the relation between evidence and hypothesis that Longi-
no describes can be any different from what happens in sensemaking between “data” and 
the “perception” or “interpretation” they produce in cognition, it should be legitimate to 
assume that we are facing exactly the same triadic relation in sensemaking processes. 
Whatever we call a perception of data is not only based on this data, but also on those 
background assumptions that are already part of our respective belief-value-attitude sys-
tems. This, however, means that attempting to reconstruct sensemaking processes com-
pletely would lead to the same infinity of background assumptions that are supported by 
evidence and further background assumptions, and so on, that we noted already as an 
implication of Longino’s approach. Although it is clear that this infinity is usually not a 
problem since, most of the time, we don’t have any reasons to doubt the evidential rela-
20 Helen  E.  Longino,  Science  as  Social  Knowledge.  Values  and  Objectivity  in  Scientific  Inquiry 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), at pp. 40, 43.
21 Ibid., p. 75. 
9tions and background assumptions that form the backbone of sensemaking processes, it 
should be clear as well that we are using cognitive shortcuts in these cases; habit-driven 
shortcuts  that—although crucial for  survival under  time pressure—demonstrate  that 
what we call knowledge and understanding is always and necessarily limited. Based on 
these principal limits of justification, we can conclude that the human mind is never able 
‘to know the whole.’
If we accept the thesis that any sensemaking process is necessarily limited, selective, 
and partly driven by habits, we should also accept two implications of this assumption. 
First, Fogelin’s distinction between “normal” argumentative exchange that is based on 
“a shared background of beliefs and preferences” on the one hand, and “deep disagree-
ments” on the other, loses some of its significance when it is simply not clear which be-
liefs and preferences are shared and which are not. If we do not even know the complete 
structure of our own background assumptions, it should be better—in order to keep at 
least the possibility of mutual understanding open—to assume some common ground 
than giving up any hope of finding it from the start.
On the other hand, if any sensemaking is inevitably limited, it is clear that this is true 
also for the scientific analysis of those sensemaking processes. There is no “frame-neu-
trality,” as Schön and Rein put it in their book on framing,22 no view from nowhere. 
There is no ‘objective’ description of conflicts. That means, the possibilities of objective 
knowledge and justifying claims as being true are also limited.
To summarize, a method of argument visualization that  focuses on reflection and 
cognitive change has to address at least three problems: First, since beliefs are always 
embedded in “webs” of mutually supporting beliefs (Buchanan), we have to think about 
strategies of how to get access—as far as possible—to entire webs of beliefs, not only 
to  singular statements. Second, since the analysis of any argument can lead—step by 
step—to a revelation of networks of mutually supporting beliefs, it should be possible to 
take any reason someone provides for a claim to start  this process. And third, as we 
learned both from Peirce’s identification of belief and habit and Bar-Tal’s observations 
about the identity-constituting function of sociopsychological infrastructures, the main 
22 Donald A. Schön and Martin Rein, Frame Reflection. Toward the Resolution of Intractable Policy  
Controversies (New York: BasicBooks, 1994), at p. 36.
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difficulty in changing people’s thinking results obviously from the fact that, first, impor-
tant background assumptions remain often implicit and unconscious and, second, that 
challenges to change belief systems are sometimes experienced as existential threat.
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR REFLECTIVE ARGUMENT 
VISUALIZATION METHODS
We can use now this list of three problems to distinguish the following requirements ar-
gument visualization methods should fulfill if their primary purpose is reflection and 
cognitive change. 
R1. In order to address webs of mutually supporting beliefs, a method of argument 
visualization should be able to represent—at least in principle—everything that 
is relevant to  understanding someone’s sensemaking processes, not  only the 
reasons this person is ready to provide for his or her claims.
R2. Such a method should allow us to visualize and explore webs of beliefs in an 
ongoing process, so that it can guide the user step by step in visualizing those 
structures.
R3. In order to overcome resistance against cognitive change, methods of argument 
visualization must be challenging and powerful.
The last point, of course, immediately raises the question of how this could be achieved. 
From my point of view, the best answer to this question has been formulated by Charles 
Peirce in what he developed as “diagrammatic reasoning.”23 Peirce’s central idea was, as 
Kathleen Hull summarized, that, by externalizing our reasoning in diagrams, we create 
23 See Frederik Stjernfelt, Diagrammatology: An Investigation on the Borderlines of Phenomenology,  
Ontology,  and  Semiotics:  Synthese  Library 336 (Dordrecht,  NL:  Springer,  2007);  Michael  H.G. 
Hoffmann, "How to Get It. Diagrammatic Reasoning as a Tool of Knowledge Development and Its 
Pragmatic Dimension," Foundations of Science, 9, 3 (2004): 285-305; and "Seeing Problems, See-
ing  Solutions.  Abduction  and  Diagrammatic  Reasoning  in  a  Theory of Scientific Discovery," in 
Olga  Pombo and  Alexander  Gerner,  Abduction  and the  Process of  Scientific  Discovery (Lisboa: 
CFCUL/Publidisa, 2007), pp. 213-36. 
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“something (non-ego) that  stands up against our consciousness. … reasoning unfolds 
when we inhibit the active side of our consciousness and allow things to act on us.”24 
The question is, however, how that could be possible, given the ‘natural’ reluctance to 
change belief-habits described above.
The crucial point of changing people’s mind by diagrammatic reasoning—or by ar-
gument visualization as a specific form of diagrammatic reasoning—is the fact, I would 
argue, that diagrams—according to Peirce’s definition—are constructed by means of “a 
perfectly consistent system of representation.”25 Such a representational system can be 
defined by three elements: (a) an ontology that defines the types of entities and relations 
that can be represented by means of the system; (b) rules according to which diagrams 
can be constructed and experiments performed; and (c) conventions which facilitate the 
process of diagrammatic reasoning. Since Peirce developed the concept of diagrammatic 
reasoning in order to explain the possibility of creativity in mathematics,26 the best exam-
ple of a “system of representation” might be an axiomatic system. A system of axioms 
does not only define the representational means that are available in the field axioma-
tized, but it determines also the necessary outcome of any operation or experimentation 
we perform within such a system.
It is crucial for the possibility of learning by diagrammatic reasoning that one has to 
be familiar with a chosen system of representation. This can best be described by an ex-
ample. Let’s take the oldest description of diagrammatic reasoning I know of, namely 
the story Plato tells in his Meno about the ‘learning’ process that an uneducated slave 
boy experiences under  the  guidance of  Socrates.  Socrates  makes  sure  that  the  boy 
knows what a square is by drawing a figure like ABCD in Figure 1 in the sand (includ-
ing something like the dotted lines) and asking him some questions about it. The side 
AB of this square is supposed to be two feet, and it turns out that the boy knows that 
the size of the square is thus four square feet,  and that  a square double the size of 
24 Kathleen Hull, "Why Hanker after Logic? Mathematical Imagination, Creativity and Perception in 
Peirce's Systematic Philosophy," Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 30 (1994): 271–95, 
pp.282, 287. See also Peirce, Collected Papers, 1.324.
25 See Peirce’s definition in  Collected Papers,  4.418. For this argument,  see also my papers that are 
listed in Footnote 23.
26 Collected Papers, 3.363 and 3.559-560.
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ABCD would be eight square feet.27 After an agreement is reached about this, Socrates 
asks the boy how long the side of the eight square feet square would be.
The boy’s first  suggestion is that  the  side 
should  be  “twice  the  length”  of  the  original 
square side, that is four feet long. Obviously, he 
simply correlates doubling the area to doubling 
the side.  But  what  does Socrates  do  to  show 
that this answer is inadequate? He experiments 
with the diagram of the square he just drew and 
demonstrates the necessary implications of the 
boy’s  suggestion  at  the  concrete  figure.  This 
operation results  in the  square  AGFE (Figure 
1). Looking at this big square, the boy must ad-
mit that his answer yields a square that is four 
times  the  size,  not  twice,  of  the  original 
square.28
At this point in the story, Plato highlights the importance of the disappointment the 
boy experiences regarding his expectations. Since he is able to acknowledge his igno-
rance regarding the matter, he is now “in a better position.” In this new situation “he 
would be glad” to find out the right answer, “whereas before he thought he could easily 
make many fine speeches to large audiences about the square of double size and said 
that it must have a base twice as long.”29 Seeing the necessary implications of his prema-
ture assumption motivates the boy to search for the correct solution. Socrates’ experi-
ment with the diagram is a way to produce this motivation.
However, what is it in this process of experimenting with the diagram that forces the 
boy to  give up his first hypothesis? Although it might sound trivial from an educated 
point of view, it is crucial to note that the boy’s insight in his failure is only possible if 
the following cognitive conditions are fulfilled. He has to accept, first, that doubling the 
side of ABCD leads necessarily to AGFE; second, that there is a contradiction between 
27 Plato, Meno, 82c,d (Stephanus pagination).
28 Ibid., 82e-83b.
29 Ibid., 84b,c.
Figure 1: What is the length of the side of  
a square whose size is double the size of  
ABCD?
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this result and his expectation; and, third, that contradictions are not acceptable, they 
have to be resolved.
The first of these conditions depends obviously on what is essential for diagrammatic 
reasoning: the consistency and rationality of the representation system we choose to 
construct a diagram. As noted above, the outcome of any experiment we perform with a 
diagram is determined by the rules of the chosen representational system. Observing the 
experiment  with the  original square,  nobody would doubt  that  doubling the side of 
ABCD leads to  AGFE, but  accepting this as true is grounded in two  very different 
things: on the one hand in the objective truth that a consistent system of representation 
like Euclidean geometry determines necessarily the outcome of the observable operation 
on the diagram and, on the other, in the subjective precondition that we are able to ac-
cept this objective truth. It is essential that, on the one hand, the representation systems 
we choose to construct a diagram are, first of all, cultural tools whose validity, useful-
ness, or appropriateness is socially established so that individuals cannot change it by 
their own choice and, on the other, that the outcome of any experiment with such a dia-
gram is necessary and true for us.
Based on this, we can say the boy’s first step of learning by means of diagrammatic 
reasoning depends on the following conditions. He has to
a) know the rules and conventions of the chosen representational system that deter-
mine the construction of a diagram and the outcome of experiments with it (at 
least so far as they are relevant for a concrete problem);
b) accept these rules and conventions;
c) accept the principle of non-contradiction;
d) feel forced to avoid contradictions, and to be motivated to look for a resolution 
of contradictions.
The general conclusion I would draw from this example is that  a learning experience 
that is induced by diagrammatic reasoning is the more compelling the clearer the rules 
and conventions of the chosen representational system are in themselves, and the more 
distinctly they are known by a learner. We can use a tool effectively only if we know 
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how it works. In this sense, systems of representation are normative systems.
It  is exactly this normativity of representational systems that  makes it possible, I 
think, to get the challenging power we need to overcome the resistance against cogni-
tive change that I mentioned above in my third requirement for methods of argument vi-
sualization.  Thus,  this third requirement could be refined as follows,  which leads us 
again to some more requirements:
R3*In order to overcome resistance against cognitive change, methods of argument 
visualization should be based on a system of representation whose rules and 
conventions are as clearly defined as possible.
R4. The rules of these representation systems must be acceptable for users indepen-
dently from their stance in a controversy, and they should be as obvious as pos-
sible (controversy should be about the content of arguments, not on how to ap-
ply the rules of a representational system).
R5. A method of argument visualization that is supposed to facilitate reflection and 
cognitive change must provide everything a user needs to evaluate the process 
of argument visualization he or she performs.
This last point might be the most important of all. As everyone can confirm who teaches 
undergraduates introductory logic or critical thinking, knowledge and a lot of practice is 
needed to evaluate the quality of an argument. If students don’t get familiar with a clear, 
normative standard with reference to which they can assess what they are doing when 
they transform an argument from its textual formulation into a symbolic or graphic form, 
the outcome will often be unacceptable for an expert. The failure to provide such a clear 
standard of argument evaluation seems to be the biggest problem of Toulmin’s famous 
model of argument (see Figure 2).30 As Ralph Johnson showed in a “critical review and 
appreciation of An Introduction to Reasoning by Stephen Toulmin, Richard Rieke, and 
Allan Janik,” these authors themselves are using the Toulmin-model in ways that are 
highly questionable. Johnson blames especially Toulmin’s “warrant” for the many prob-
30 Stephen  Toulmin,  The  Uses  of  Argument (Cambridge,  U.K.;  New York:  Cambridge  University 
Press, 2003 <1958>, updated ed.).
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lems he finds in the examples of this textbook. “Toulmin’s explanation of the concept of 
a warrant is loose rather than tight,”31 and it is defined in so many different ways that it 
is hardly surprising that users take it as they want. 
The crucial point is that there is not much of 
a need to  reflect critically on one’s thinking if 
there are only weak constraints on how to visu-
alize an argument. If nearly everything is possi-
ble, it is difficult to evaluate the quality of what 
one is doing when constructing arguments. An 
evaluation can only be justified if there is a clear 
normative standard. This allows us to reformu-
late the requirement R5 as follows:
R5*A method of argument visualization that is supposed to facilitate reflection and 
cognitive change must provide a clear normative standard to evaluate the pro-
cess of argument visualization. Such clarity depends on two conditions: first, 
there must be a finite list of elements that constitute the standard and, second, 
these elements must be as clearly defined as possible, avoiding any ambiva-
lence. 
III. LIMITATIONS OF AVAILABLE ARGUMENT 
VISUALIZATION METHODS
The question is now, of course,  how a concrete  and usable model of argumentation 
could be designed that indeed fulfills the five requirements listed above. If we take a 
look at what is on the market so far, we can identify some limitations of available argu-
ment  visualization tools.  Toulmin’s model of  argument—besides the  problems men-
tioned  above—offers  only six  elements  that  constitute  an  argument  (see  Figure  2 
31 Ralph H. Johnson, The Rise of Informal Logic (Newport News, VA: Vale Press, 1996), p. 134; see 
also James B. Freeman, "Systematizing Toulmin’s Warrants: An Epistemic Approach," Argumenta-
tion, 19, 3 (2005): 331-46.
Figure  2:  The  famous  "Toulmin  model,"  
from "The Uses of Argument," p. 97. "D" 
means  data,  "W"  warrant,  “B”  backing,  
"Q" qualifier, "C" claim, and "R" rebuttal.
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above). That means, this model does not invite the user to explore entire “webs” of mu-
tually supporting beliefs, values, and attitudes in a dynamic way (as demanded by re-
quirements R1 and R2). Quite the contrary: It has been shown that this fixed pattern of 
argument often leads users “to squeeze everything into a single simple diagram”32 so that 
results are more confusing than enlightening.
More interesting with regard to detailed analyses of very complex issues are Robert 
Horn’s “argumentation maps.” These maps structure great historical debates like “Can 
Computers Think?” based on an analysis of hundreds of publications.33 However, they 
do not visualize singular “arguments” in the sense defined above, but only the relations 
among arguments (“is supported by” / “is disputed by”) which for themselves are sum-
marized in normal text descriptions. However, it would be interesting to combine his fo-
cus on representing the macro-structure of debates with a micro-analysis of singular ar-
guments whose main purpose should be to  reveal how people frame an issue, which 
background assumptions are relevant that are not expressed in the original formulation, 
and whether there are weak points and contradictions.
While Horn focuses on representing a detailed picture  of debates that  developed 
over decades by abstracting from the micro-structure of arguments, visualization meth-
ods that are based on Rittel’s “Issue Based Information System” (IBIS) like Jeff Conk-
lin’s  Dialogue Mapping34 and similar software tools35 often concentrate on processes 
that take place before precise arguments are formulated. The main goal is here—as with 
“mind mapping” software—to cope with complexity. Available tools can either be used 
by individuals to  clarify complex issues or by facilitators of group communication; in 
real time, the facilitator would put on a screen what people say in debates, thus chal-
32 Des R. Gasper and R. V. George, "Analyzing Argumentation in Planning and Public Policy: Assess-
ing, Improving, and Transcending the Toulmin Model," Environment and Planning B-Planning & 
Design, 25, 3 (May, 1998): 367-90, at p. 367. 
33 See  Robert  E.  Horn,  Jeffrey Yoshimi,  Mark  Deering,  and  Russell McBride,  Mapping Great  De-
bates: Can Computers Think? (Map) (Bainbridge Island, WA: Macrovu Pr, 1998; also available via 
http://www.macrovu.com/.). 
34 Jeffrey Conklin,  Dialogue Mapping: Building Shared Understanding of Wicked Problems (Chich-
ester, England; Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2006).
35 See for example Tim van Gelder’s “ReasonAble,” “Rationale,” and “bCisive” (www.austhink.com) 
and Simon Buckingham Shum’s “Compendium” and “Cohere” (http://kmi.open.ac.uk/). 
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lenging participants to reflect on questions like what the main points of a debate are and 
how to structure the discussion by distinguishing pro and contra considerations, reasons 
and objections, but also ideas and questions. Although “arguments” in the sense defined 
here may be an important part of these visualization approaches, the primary objective is 
to clarify issues. Conklin’s main intention is to help groups to cope with problems of so-
cial complexity and “wicked problems” in meetings, and for others the goal is “keeping 
track of a plethora of ideas, issues, and conceptual interrelationships.”36 The process of 
“argument” visualization includes here activities like problem solving; the generation of 
hypotheses and evaluation criteria; expressing doubt and disbelief; reifying, contrasting, 
criticizing,  and integrating perspectives.  However,  though all this goes  well beyond 
“providing reasons for a claim,” many of these approaches have been proven successful 
with regard to  stimulating reflection and managing controversies in which “arguments 
seemed to just go around in circles, and disagreement seemed only to become more en-
trenched.”37 A limitation, however, of these approaches can be seen in the fact the repre-
sentational systems used are often not clearly enough defined (R3*; R5*). Instead of en-
forcing a normative standard of argument analysis, construction, and evaluation, nearly 
everything is possible. Everything can be put on a screen—or not be put on a screen—
without really challenging the user to change basic assumptions and webs of beliefs, be-
cause those assumptions and webs can remain hidden forever.
Much more precise with regard to defining the rules, conventions, and ontologies of 
argument visualization systems are those models that are presently developed in com-
puter science. The main goal here is to provide realistic models of concrete arguments.38 
36 See Albert M. Selvin, "Fostering Collective Intelligence: Helping Groups Use Visualized Argumen-
tation," in Paul A. Kirschner, Simon J. Buckingham Shum and Chad S. Carr, Visualizing Argumen-
tation: Software Tools for Collaborative and Educational Sense-Making (London: Springer, 2003), 
pp. 137-63, at p. 138.
37 Tim  J.  van  Gelder,  "Enhancing  Deliberation  through  Computer-Supported  Argument 
Visualization," in Paul A. Kirschner,  Simon J. Buckingham Shum and Chad S. Carr,  Visualizing  
Argumentation: Software Tools for Collaborative and Educational Sense-Making (London: Spring-
er, 2003), pp. 97-115, at p. 108.
38 See, for instance, Phan Minh Dung in his seminal paper "On the Acceptability of Arguments and Its 
Fundamental Role in Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Logic Programming and N-Person Games," Artifi-
cial Intelligence, 77, 2 (Sep, 1995): 321-57, p. 321: “The purpose of this paper is to study the funda-
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Objectives are things like (a) modeling how the burden of proof shifts in argumentative 
discourse;39 (b) designing models that support and visualize argumentations in legal set-
tings40 and in the context of deliberative democracy;41 and (c) defining an “Argument In-
terchange Format” (AIF) that is rich enough so that data and structures of all available 
argument models can be represented in one, comprehensive model.42
As far as I can see, there are three major problems with computational models of ar-
gument: The first one is that they are either still in development or cover only parts of a 
visualization method that could fulfill all the requirements listed above. The second is 
that  what is developed so far is much too  complicated to  be ‘user friendly;’ this, of 
course, is not surprising given the fact that the primary goal is to implement argumenta-
tive procedures in software, not to provide tools that could be used by, let’s say, high 
school students. The third problem is more serious: Since the final goal is to model real-
istically how people argue, the development of software proceeds basically ‘inductively.’ 
While everything has to be designed in a way that it can be computed, implying that the 
formulation of general rules describing argument moves is crucial, the human practice of 
“arguing” is obviously so broad and ill-defined that it is hard to see how a final system 
of argument rules could be simple enough to be used as a normative standard. While the 
Toulmin model turned out to be too limited in its expressive power, these computational 
models offer such a huge variety of “argument schemes,”43 “conflict schemes,” “prefer-
mental  mechanism humans use in argumentation,  and to explore ways to implement this mecha-
nism on computers.”
39 See Thomas F. Gordon, Henry Prakken, and Douglas Walton, "The Carneades Model of Argument 
and Burden of Proof," Artificial Intelligence, 171, 10-15 (2007): 875-96. 
40 A useful overview is provided by Chris Reed, Douglas Walton, and Fabrizio Macagno, "Argument 
Diagramming in Logic, Law and Artificial Intelligence," The Knowledge Engineering Review, 22, 1 
(2007): 87-109.
41 Katie Atkinson, Trevor Bench-Capon, and Peter McBurney, "Parmenides: Facilitating Deliberation 
in Democracies," Artificial Intelligence and Law, 14, 4 (2006): 261-75.
42 See C. Chesnevar, J. McGinnis, S. Modgil, I. Rahwan, C. Reed, G. Simari, M. South, G. Vreeswijk, 
and S. Willmott, "Towards an Argument Interchange Format," Knowledge Engineering Review, 21, 
4 (December, 2006): 293-316.
43 See for various lists Douglas Walton,  Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning:  Studies  
in  Argumentation  Theory (Mahwah,  NJ:  Lawrence Erlbaum,  1995);  John  L.  Pollock,  Cognitive  
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ence schemes,” and so on, that they tend to be too complex. The underlying rules are 
neither obvious enough to challenge a user to reflect critically on implicit assumptions 
(R4), nor do they provide a simple and clear standard of argument construction that a 
user could apply to evaluate the quality of his or her arguments (R5*).
As I showed with regard to Peirce’s concept of diagrammatic reasoning, we can use 
tools effectively only if we know how they work. The less we think about a tool, the 
more we can focus on what we want to achieve with it. If the grammar of a visualization 
‘language’ is too  complicated, it will be hard to  meet the five requirements I  distin-
guished in the previous section.
IV. LOGICAL ARGUMENT MAPPING (LAM)
Logical Argument Mapping, the method I want to propose in this section as a tool to 
stimulate reflection and cognitive change, has been designed to fulfill these five require-
ments. The main strategy to achieve this goal is a system of representation that imposes
—by contrast to  all the other argument visualization methods I discussed so far—the 
standard of deductive validity on the construction of the central parts of an argumenta-
tion. This design decision is most clearly expressed in the three rules that determine the 
normative standard of Logical Argument Mapping:
1. Represent your main argument—and every sub-argument that might be contro-
versial—according to an argument scheme whose deductive validity is evident or 
can be made plausible.44
Carpentry. A Blueprint for How to Build a Person (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995); and Joel 
Katzav and Chris A. Reed, "On Argumentation Schemes and the Natural  Classification of Argu-
ments," Argumentation, 18, 2 (2004): 239-59.
44 It is still an open question how to define exactly the list of logically valid argument schemes avail-
able in LAM, but the following seems to be a good starting point for a list that is, on the one hand, 
comprehensive  enough  for  the  most  frequent  applications  and,  on  the  other,  limited  enough  to 
achieve the clarity needed for cognitive change: modus ponens, modus tollens, disjunctive syllogism, 
XOR syllogism (while the XOR syllogism is based on an “exclusive or” in “either – or,” the disjunc-
tive syllogism uses an “inclusive or,” that is both sides of “either – or” can be true), not-both syllo-
gism (based on “NAND” for “not and”), conditional syllogism, constructive dilemma, equivalence; 
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2. Consider the acceptability of all your premises, and provide further arguments 
for those whose acceptability is either not evident or controversial.
3. Make sure that all your premises are consistent with each other.
Given the development of “argumentation theory,” “informal logic,” and “critical think-
ing” over the last fifty years, the focus on deductive argument schemes might sound like 
a backwards revolution. When Stephen Toulmin revolutionized thinking on argumenta-
tion in The Uses of Argument, he started by criticizing traditional logic as being out of 
touch with any practical application. Since Descartes, he says, logic became a more and 
more  specialized,  philosophical discipline “in isolation from all practical contexts.”45 
Logic became a “theoretical study on its own, as free from all practical concerns as is 
some branch of pure mathematics.”46 Based on this observation, he saw the need “to re-
dress the balance between formal logic and rhetoric, theory and practice, or the ‘analyti-
cal’ and ‘non-analytical’ aspects of human reasoning.”47 However, the fact that logic can 
be studied and developed as a ‘pure’ scientific discipline like any other can hardly be an 
argument against an approach that uses some basic logical inferences for practical pur-
poses.
More  serious  objections against  so-called “deductivism” in argumentation theory 
have been formulated by the “informal logic” movement.48 However, the term “deduc-
tivism” has been used here, as far as I can see, in three different ways. A short discus-
sion of these should help to better understand the role of deductive argument schemes in 
complete induction, argument from perfect authority, and argument from perfect analogy (more on 
the last three in a moment), and the fifteen valid forms of deduction in categorical logic.
45 "Logic, Rhetoric & Reason: Redressing the Balance," in F.H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J.A. 
Blair and C.A. Williard,  Argumentation Illuminated: Selected Papers from the 1990 International  
Conference on Argumentation (Dordrecht: Foris, 1992), pp. 3-11, at pp. 3-5. 
46 Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, p. 2 and 88.
47 "Logic, Rhetoric & Reason,” p. 5.
48 For a comprehensive discussion of these objections see Ralph H. Johnson,  Manifest Rationality: A  
Pragmatic Theory of Argument (Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2000), p. 57-107. It 
is important to note, however, that Johnson discusses “deductivism” as a  theory of argumentation. 
This is not what I have in mind when using deductive argument schemes in LAM. LAM is a meth-
od, not a theory.
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Logical Argument Mapping. A first useful distinction has been provided by David God-
den: “deductivism can be formulated as an evaluative and as a reconstructive (or inter-
pretive) thesis.”49 He tracks both these theses back to quotes from Leo Groarke, and de-
fines the “evaluative” view of deductivism by the thesis that “all good arguments are de-
ductively valid,”50 and the “reconstructive” view as the thesis that “natural language ar-
guments should be understood as attempts to formulate deductive arguments.”51 A third 
form of “deductivism” has been suggested by Ralph Johnson when he defines the term 
as “the view that reasoning is inherently deductive in character.”52
It is important to note that only the second of these definitions—if interpreted in a 
certain way—comes close to  the deductive character  of Logical Argument Mapping. 
Regarding the third one, the point is that the empirical question of how humans reason 
does not have any relevance for LAM since the method does not intend to  represent 
reasoning, but to stimulate it. LAM is not based on a descriptive thesis, but on a strate-
gic, or heuristic, thesis; the thesis, namely, that it is useful—with the regard to the goals 
of reflective argumentation—to  challenge people to  reconstruct  their thinking in the 
form of deductively valid arguments. Even if we assume that human reasoning proceeds 
arbitrarily, irrationally, or driven by all kinds of non-deductive mechanisms, we can still 
propose the thesis that representing reasoning in the form of deductive inferences can be 
helpful when it comes to clarifying and structuring this reasoning. As described in the 
debate on “distributed cognition” and the “extended mind” in cognitive science,53 LAM 
49 David J. Godden, "Deductivism as an Interpretive Strategy: A Reply to Groarke’s Defense of Recon-
structive Deductivism," Argumentation and Advocacy, 41, 3 (2005): 168-83, p. 168.
50 Leo Groarke, "In Defense of Deductivism: Replying to Govier," in F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grooten-
dorst,  J.  A.  Blair  and  C.  Willard,  Argumentation  Illuminated (Amsterdam:  Sic-Sat,  1992),  pp. 
113-21, p. 113.
51 Groarke, "Deductivism within Pragma-Dialectics," Argumentation, 13, 1 (1999): 1-16, p. 2.
52 Ralph H. Johnson, "Informal Logic and Epistemology," Anthropology & Philosophy, 8, 1-2 (2007): 
69-88, p. 73.
53 See, for instance, Edwin Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995); Andy 
Clark and David Chalmers, "The Extended Mind," Analysis, 58, 1 (1998): 7-19; Andy Clark, "Cur-
ing  Cognitive Hiccups:  A Defense of the Extended Mind,"  Journal  of  Philosophy,  104,  4 (Apr, 
2007): 163-92; and Michael H.G. Hoffmann, "Learning from People, Things, and Signs," Studies in  
Philosophy and Education, 26, 3 (2007): 185-204.
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is supposed to work like a scaffold for reasoning, not as a picture of it.
Similarly, the evaluative thesis that only deductively valid arguments are “good” ar-
guments has not only been convincingly refuted by many counterexamples which show 
that we are generally ready to appreciate the quality of non-deductive arguments as well, 
but again: evaluating the quality of arguments that we find in everyday life is not the 
task Logical Argument Mapping is supposed to accomplish. Relevant for LAM is only 
the second definition, the one which Godden discusses as “reconstructive” or “interpre-
tative.” The formulation, however, he provides for this definition is ambivalent. Groarke 
wrote: “By deductivism I mean the view that natural language arguments should be un-
derstood as attempts to  formulate deductive arguments.”54 Godden in his criticism of 
this form of deductivism seems to interpret this quote as saying that according to the de-
ductivist view everyone who formulates an argument is driven, at least implicitly, by the 
objective to provide a deductive argument. This way, Groarke’s definition would be a 
descriptive claim that  raises, as Godden says, “the question whether  an argument  is 
properly reconstructed as aiming at a deductive standard of evidence.” 55 However, for 
Groarke the question is not whether it is adequate to represent any natural language ar-
gument as a deduction, but whether we should do it. His claim is a normative claim, not 
a descriptive one, so the question is not whether he is right, but whether his suggestion 
can be justified as useful.56
Groarke does not only show—as it is well-known— that any argument can easily be 
transformed into a deductively valid argument by adding a further premise that connects
—by means of an appropriate formulation—the other premises with the conclusion, but 
he justifies his suggestion that we should indeed do so by an argument that is relevant 
for Logical Argument Mapping as well. His point is that  the “unexpressed premises” 
that we “should” express as the additional premises in deductions are important because 
they “often expose assumptions which need to be a focus of discussion when we decide 
54 Groarke, "Deductivism within Pragma-Dialectics," p. 2.
55 Godden, “Deductivism as an Interpretive Strategy,” p. 175-176; italics are mine.
56 This is exactly the question Groarke formulates at p. 8 of “Deductivism within Pragma-Dialectics.” 
It is surprising that Godden, although he correctly titles his paper “Deductivism as an Interpretive 
Strategy,” nowhere discusses Groarke’s arguments for this strategy, and whether this strategy is ef-
fective for the goals Groarke has in mind. 
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whether an argument should be accepted.” That is, Groarke’s strategy to model argu-
ments as deductions “can help identify the issues that need to be addressed in dialectical 
exchange. … By recognizing these assumptions as unexpressed premises, a deductivist 
approach furthers the dialectical exchange which is the key to resolving differences of 
opinion.”57
Godden is absolutely right when he says that this way “all argument assessment be-
comes a matter of determining premise acceptability,” and that the assessment of prem-
ise acceptability “is a task for science, not logic.”58 But exactly this, I would argue, is the 
main advantage of “reconstructive” deductionism as a strategy. When it comes to evalu-
ating the quality of deductive arguments, we can clearly separate evaluating the argu-
ment’s form and its content.59 By “clearly” separating I mean that the evaluation of one 
of the two should not influence the evaluation of the other.  This, by contrast,  is not 
guaranteed  with non-deductive arguments.  We can expect,  for example, that  people 
would reject the form of arguments from analogy, expert opinion, or slippery-slope ar-
guments simply based on the fact that the concrete content of these arguments they are 
confronted with in a certain situation is unacceptable to them. This should hardly be the 
case with deductively valid argument forms. In so far as we can evaluate the validity of a 
deduction by replacing what is claimed in its propositions by variables, it is clear that the 
evaluation of its form can clearly be distinguished from evaluating its content. Whatever 
the content may be, it is always possible to argue for the validity of modus ponens, mo-
dus tollens, conditional syllogism, and so on, independently of any specific content. This 
is not the case for non-deductive arguments.
Even if everything else is contested, logical necessity—and its counterpart, the prin-
57 Groarke, "Deductivism within Pragma-Dialectics," p. 9.
58 Godden, “Deductivism as an Interpretive Strategy,” p. 174.
59 At this point, I depart  from Groarke’s argument for reconstructive deductivism, because he main-
tains a distinction between “deductive validity and ‘formal validity’” which is hardly convincing. If 
deductive validity, as he claims, is not defined by formal considerations, it can only be determined 
by considerations that depend on epistemic assumptions  regarding the truth or certainty of what is 
claimed in the premises and conclusion of an argument. This leads to a very strange concept of “de-
ductive validity,” as it becomes visible in his example for a “deductive” argument on p. 11 of his 
“Deductivism within Pragma-Dialectics.”
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ciple of non-contradiction—is something everybody should be ready to accept.60 When 
somebody accepts both the propositions “p” and “if p, then q” as being true but rejects 
to accept “q” as being true, then this person simply excludes herself or himself from the 
community of people we would consider being worthwhile to  argue with in the first 
place. Demanding the acceptance of the principle of non-contradiction as a precondition 
for reasonable communication seems to  be an idea that  is universally shared.61 That 
means, deductively valid arguments can provide an Archimedean point stable enough to 
move things even in conflicts and controversies. 
The possibility to  clearly separate  controversy on an argument’s content from its 
logical form leads us immediately to the idea that the evaluation of deductive arguments 
can be simplified by distinguishing two different processes: first, checking whether a giv-
en argument is deductively valid, that is whether it follows the logical form that is pre-
defined, or demonstrable, as valid for a certain argument scheme; and second, the pro-
cess of reflecting—either individually or in what Pinto called a “critical dialogue”62—on 
the question whether the  reasons used in an argument are acceptable. While the first 
process can be performed more or less mechanically—since this is only about assessing 
60 The argument for this normative claim goes back to Aristotle’s justification of the principle of non-
contradiction  by indirect  demonstration  (Metaphysics  IV  4,  1006a15-25:  elenktikôs  apodeixai). 
While it is impossible to prove the principle directly because doing so would already presuppose the 
principle itself, we can prove it by shifting the burden of proof to an opponent’s side. As long as 
such an opponent says anything at all, “he signifies something both for himself and for another...  
For, if he does not signify something, such a man would not have language and reason (logos), nei-
ther for himself nor for somebody else. But if any one grants this, demonstration will be possible; for 
[in signifying something] something is already defined (estai hôrismenon, i.e. a boundary is drawn 
that delineates what belongs to it and what does not).” The point is, such a definition or boundary 
would be destroyed if someone says “something is  x and is not  x at the same time.” If there is no 
longer  a  boundary between including  and  excluding  a predicate,  “then  dialog with  other  people 
would be annihilated, and indeed with oneself as well; for it is impossible to think if one does not 
think of one thing” (1006b8-10). 
61 See Gregor Paul, “Argumente für die Universalität der Logik,”  Horin - Vergleichende Studien zur  
japanischen Kultur, 1 (1994): 57-86, p. 86; and “Logic in Buddhist Text. With Particular Reference 
to the Zhonglun,” Horin - Vergleichende Studien zur japanischen Kultur, 11 (2004): 39-56.
62 Robert C. Pinto,  Argument,  Inference and Dialectic.  Collected Papers on Informal Logic:  Argu-
mentation Library, Vol. 4 (Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer Academic, 2001), at pp. 123, 131.
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whether a given argument meets the requirements of a predefined argument form—the 
process of reflection leads simply to an open-ended exchange of further arguments that 
either produces, eventually, agreement or at least a better understanding of the positions 
at stake.
This distinction between two evaluation processes allows a clear distinction between 
a logical and an epistemic question. While the former is as simple (or complicated) as 
the logical system used, the latter has to be decided in a process of argumentation any-
way. If any justification of an evidential relation—as we saw with regard to Longino’s 
triadic  epistemology—is  mediated  by  background  assumptions  whose  justification 
would lead us to further background assumptions, and so on, it is clear that any contro-
versy about the acceptability of premises in an argument can only be decided by further 
arguments. Epistemic questions are open questions; they are as open as the development 
of scientific knowledge. 
We should keep in mind, however, that the main point in reflective argumentation is 
neither to create knowledge or justified belief, nor consensus or persuasion, but to stim-
ulate reflection and cognitive change. For this, the only thing we really need is a system 
of representation whose rules are acceptable across all party lines; rules that allow com-
munication even in cases of deepest disagreement regarding the content of a controver-
sy; a language whose grammar is evident, or can be made plausible, to everyone. This, I 
believe, can be achieved by reducing the language of argument to its logical core, that is 
by using only a limited set of deductively valid argument schemes for those arguments 
that are critical in a controversy. The more we are living in different worlds and playing 
incommensurable language games, the more we need a language in which at least a core 
is commonly shared—simply to  allow the possibility of communicating about what is 
not shared.
The possibility to distinguish clearly between an argument’s logical validity and the 
epistemic question whether its premises are acceptable is my first reason for assuming 
that the reconstructive deductivism realized in Logical Argument Mapping is a useful 
and effective strategy to achieve the goals of reflective argumentation. But there are two 
further reasons. 
The second reason for focusing on logical argument schemes is that a system of rep-
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resentation that concentrates on these can be much simpler, easier to learn, and there-
fore more powerful when it comes to both stimulating cognitive change and evaluating 
one’s own argument construction than those systems that try to include every possible 
form of argument. It is clear that the set of deductively valid argument forms is only a 
subset of a larger set that includes not only inductive arguments but all sorts of argu-
ment schemes that have been studied in informal logic over the last decade.63 However, 
if the argument that I developed above with regard to diagrammatic reasoning is correct, 
then it should be more important to provide a limited but powerful system of representa-
tion than one that is too complex.
The third reason for using logical argument schemes is that these schemes provide a 
clear normative standard with regard to the completeness of an argument. To get a de-
ductively valid argument, we do not only need a reason for a claim, but also the guaran-
tee that this reason is sufficient to deduce this claim. In a logical argument, this can be 
guaranteed by the additional premise already mentioned: it has been called the “major 
premise” in syllogistic logic, and “inference rule” in other contexts. In LAM, the infer-
ence rule is supposed to represent the assumption of a universal law: a law-like relation 
between reason and claim. In a modus ponens argument, for example, we do not only 
provide a reason p for the claim q, but also the inference rule “if p, then q.”64 It is easy 
to see that the truth of both the reason and the inference rule guarantee with logical ne-
cessity the truth of the claim.
Even though in normal conversation hardly anybody provides complete arguments in 
this sense, being challenged to do so has two decisive advantages. First, we get access 
to implicit background assumptions. The reason for this is the following. The fact that 
somebody provides a certain reason for a certain claim is either based on this person’s 
assumption that this reason is indeed acceptable as a  reason for this claim or it is not 
63 See Footnote 43 and Douglas Walton, Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation: Critical Reasoning  
and Argumentation (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
64 The validity of the modus ponens requires, of course, that statements like “if p, then q,” “p implies 
q,” or “p is a sufficient condition for q” are defined by the truth table for the material conditional. 
However, the well-known problems of the material conditional (“if grass is green, then the moon is 
made of cheese”) do not apply here since the second rule requires that an arguer must be willing to 
defend the truth or acceptability of those statements as general rules.
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based on this assumption. Since we would not provide a certain reason without assum-
ing that this reason is indeed acceptable as a reason for a certain claim, the latter can be 
excluded. This means, if someone provides p as a reason for q, and if the structure of 
the argument this person has in mind can be represented in modus ponens form, then we 
can assume that an inference rule like “if p, then q” is part of this person’s background 
assumptions.65 And this again means that visualizing this background assumption in form 
of an inference rule is the first step to getting access to it. 
It is important to note that the point here is not whether someone really believes that 
“if p, then q” is true, or has at least some awareness of such a proposition.66 Mapping a 
modus ponens argument in LAM is not supposed to represent someone’s reasoning ade-
quately, as already mentioned. The crucial point is solely that such a representation stim-
ulates our reflection on the acceptability of what is visualized. Even if it turns out that 
the universal rule “if p, then q” is false, or even if someone would not accept the strong 
inference rule “if p, then q” in case she provides p as a reason for q, but might prefer 
something weaker like “if p, then probably q,” it still makes sense from a strategic and 
heuristic point of view to challenge this person to formulate her argument in the stron-
ger, deductive form. Again, the objective is to stimulate reflection, to direct attention to 
possible background assumptions,  and to  motivate  the development  of further  argu-
ments, objections, refinements of formulations, or at least the recognition of open ques-
tions and problems.
This leads directly to the second advantage of being challenged to construct logically 
complete arguments. As already indicated by Groarke: if we are visualizing an argument 
completely, everything is on the table that can be attacked and must be defended by fur-
ther arguments in case of doubt or controversy. An argument whose conclusion is nec-
essarily true if all the premises are true can only be weakened or defeated by attacking 
one of its premises. This means that mapping arguments in deductive form inevitably 
65 Groarke in "Deductivism within Pragma-Dialectics” provided a similar argument: the speech acts 
“argument” and “assertion” imply that the performer of these speech acts commits herself to the be-
lief that her conclusion is true if her premises are true (pp. 6-7).
66 This counters Godden’s first criticism of the Groarke’s argument that is mentioned in the previous 
note; see Godden, “Deductivism as an Interpretive Strategy,” p. 178. His second argument against 
Groarke is refuted by what follows.
28
guides our reflection in a certain direction. Since any logically complete argument can be 
attacked by two strategies—either by criticizing the evidence or the inferential relation 
between evidence and claim—it is clear that we need to be ready to defend always two 
things independently of each other: on the one hand the truth of the reasons provided 
and, on the other, the truth of the inference rule that would legitimate using something 
as reason for something else. This way, Logical Argument Mapping is expected to guide 
the user in a step-by-step process that should reveal, eventually, the inferential structure 
of an entire web of beliefs—as far as it is relevant for a certain position in a certain situ-
ation.
To summarize, the normative standard of logical validity as it is formulated in the 
three rules of Logical Argument Mapping should be sufficient to meet the five require-
ments necessary for reflective argumentation that I listed above. The limited list of clear-
ly defined argument schemes mentioned in the first rule allows us to evaluate the com-
pleteness of arguments (i.e., to  check whether all the elements that are required for a 
certain argument scheme are formulated), and the second rule challenges us to assess 
the acceptability of all their premises (R5*). At the same time, since the rules and the ar-
gument schemes of LAM form a clearly defined, normative standard of how to present 
arguments, the method challenges us in a way that resistance against cognitive change 
can be overcome (R3*).
Since the validity of these argument schemes is either evident or can be demonstrat-
ed independently from any specific content, the LAM rules should be acceptable for ev-
eryone independently of his or her specific stance in a controversy. This means, a con-
troversy can be about the content of an argumentation, not about how to construct logi-
cally valid arguments (R4).
Finally, the challenge to construct complete arguments will lead, first, to a represen-
tation of important elements of an arguer’s implicit background assumptions as they be-
come visible in an argument’s inference rule; secondly, it will guide the process of argu-
ment visualization step by step (R2). Visualizing background assumptions provides ac-
cess to them. And getting access to those implicit patterns of thinking is a precondition 
to reflect critically on them, to criticize or defend them by further arguments, and, thus, 
to explore entire “webs” of mutually supporting beliefs in an ongoing process. Nothing 
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that is relevant for a certain argument remains hidden if logical completeness is required. 
This opens up those belief-value-attitude systems that are crucial for sensemaking and 
framing (R1).
The main point is that LAM’s normative standard challenges the user, first, to break 
down complex considerations or vague ideas into a clearly structured network of mutu-
ally supporting arguments and, second, to  reflect on the acceptability of the premises 
and implicit background assumptions that become visible this way. As long as we sepa-
rate logical and epistemic processes of argument construction and evaluation, we can 
delegate all the questions that divide us in controversies to an open-ended process of re-
flection and argument construction while, at  the same time, getting a communication 
tool whose reasonableness can be accepted independently of all partisanship.
V. AN EXEMPLARY PROCESS OF ARGUMENT MAPPING
To provide an example of how LAM can be used as a method of reflective argumenta-
tion, let me map an argument that has been discussed in the public policy literature in a 
debate on limitations of Toulmin’s model of argument.67 Using the conventions defined 
in the key on top of the map, the original argument can be represented as in Figure 3. 
The  original Toulmin-style visualization formulated  the  following as  the  argument’s 
67 Gasper & George, “Analyzing Argumentation,” p. 375.
Figure 3: A universal statement as a claim (left), and a particular as reason (right)
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“warrant”:  “And since  US actions with respect  to  Cuba are representative of foreign 
policy decisions in general ...” While according to Toulmin’s approach the exact func-
tion of what he calls “warrant” is not specified—besides the general requirement that the 
warrant has to “authorize” the step from the reason to the claim—in LAM we have to 
decide according to which argument scheme the argument should be constructed. This 
again determines the exact wording of the “warrant”—or the “inference rule,” in my ter-
minology. Looking at the list of logical argument schemes that are defined in LAM68—
and based on the intention of the original argument as it becomes visible in its warrant—
we can see that the argument can be formulated as “complete induction”69 (Figure 4, 
blue part).
If we look at the inference rule (in the middle) that we are forced to use in order to  
reconstruct the argument as complete induction, the advantage of permitting only logi-
cally valid argument schemes becomes obvious: This strong requirement stimulates our 
reflection on the question whether this inference rule can really be accepted. Since any 
universal statement can be refuted by only one counterexample, it becomes immediately 
clear—based on the objections on the right—that this inference rule is unacceptable. We 
are challenged, thus, to reconsider the whole issue more carefully. 
Looking at the case of the Soviet Union, for example, could thus lead to what Peirce 
called a “theoric shift,” a change of perspective, that can be summarized then under the 
concept “diplomatic efficiency” (a “hypostatic abstraction” that is new to the original ar-
gument).70 This opens up the possibility to  revise the whole argumentation. Although 
representing those “revision schemes” in the map itself is not necessary, visualizing these 
68 See http://www.prism.gatech.edu/~mh327/LAM/. 
69 Complete induction—also called “mathematical” or “recursive induction” in the axiomatization of 
arithmetic—is a deductively valid argument form. See [link to the author’s webpage], and William 
Kneale and Martha Kneale,  The Development of Logic (Oxford: Clarendon Pr., 1988 <1962>), p. 
467-77. To enlarge the set of deductive argument schemes that are available in LAM, some non-de-
ductive argument forms (induction; arguments from authority and analogy) have been transformed 
into logically valid forms. 
70 See Hoffmann, “Seeing problem,” and "Signs as Means for Discoveries. Peirce and His Concepts of 
'Diagrammatic Reasoning,'  'Theorematic Deduction,'  'Hypostatic Abstraction,'  and 'Theoric Trans-
formation',"  in Michael H.G. Hoffmann,  Johannes Lenhard  and Falk Seeger,  Activity  and Sign – 
Grounding Mathematics Education (New York: Springer, 2005), pp. 45-56.
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reflective steps can stimulate our reasoning on the whole issue. One could think, for in-
stance, that the initial focus on a general claim like “diplomatic recognition is a sign of 
approval” does not make much sense. Why not, instead, focus on a concrete problem 
like the question whether the US should recognize Iran? This way, a quite substantial re-
vision of our thinking could be possible (Figure 5); a revision that leads again to new 
questions. But this is exactly what reflective argumentation is supposed to do.
VI. CONCLUSION
Tim van Gelder once remarked that  trying to  represent  arguments only in deductive 
Figure 4: In blue the original argument with a supporting consideration, and in red some objections and  
further reflections. “AU” refers to the author of an argument. In this case, the universal statement that  
forms the main argument’s inference rule can easily be defeated by two counterexamples. “RevScheme”  
refers to “argument revision scheme,” that is a scheme according to which arguments can be revised in  
LAM. “Theoric shift” means a change of perspective; “hypostatic abstraction” is the creation of a new  
concept for a new idea.
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forms would be like “trying to fit a left foot into a right shoe.”71 This is indeed exactly 
what should happen in Logical Argument Mapping. The crucial difference is, however, 
that I hope that our habits of thinking show some more ‘plasticity’ than our feet, and 
that they can adapt to a framework that should work more like a scaffold than a corset. 
The point of my argument is not that  we design argument visualization tools that  fit 
nicely to the paths we are thinking in anyway, but tools that affect and guide our reason-
71 Personal communication.
Figure 5: A complete revision of the original argument that leads  
to a new differentiation of the problem
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ing. If the goal is reflective argumentation—that is, to stimulate reflection on one’s own 
thinking by constructing and evaluating arguments—then, as I tried to argue in this pa-
per, we need a representational system to  visualize arguments that  is challenging and 
powerful enough to motivate cognitive change and learning; a normative standard of ar-
gument construction and evaluation that forces us to be more precise and more reflec-
tive regarding implicit background assumptions than we might wish to  be; a standard 
that helps us to clarify our thinking, and to identify weak points and unknowns; a visual 
language that motivates reflection so that we can overcome the limitations and simplifi-
cations of habitualized ways of thinking; a normative standard of argument visualization 
that should be universally acceptable72 so that it can provide a communication and re-
flection tool even for situations where everything else is contested.
My goal was to show that a representational system like Logical Argument Mapping 
can have the power to affect our thinking and to stimulate cognitive change. Being chal-
lenged to construct arguments that are logically complete will at least force us to expli-
cate all those assumptions that might otherwise hinder cognitive change and learning. 
Only what is visibly on the table motivates reflection, criticism, and support by further 
arguments.
72 This does not mean “eternal.” The normativity of representation systems does not exclude their evo-
lution; see for instance the development from Euclidean to non-Euklidean axiomatizations of geom-
etry.
